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POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY THEORY
POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON
INSTITUTIONS. By Jeremy Waldron.1 Harvard University
Press. 2016. Pp. 403. $35.00 (cloth).
Jeremy D. Farris2 and William A. Edmundson3
INTRODUCTION
Political theory has not always been a self-confident
discipline. In 1961, Isaiah Berlin, the Chichele Professor of Social
and Political Theory at Oxford, wondered whether it continued to
exist. His answer was irresolute. Berlin thought that political
theory’s existence was assured because it poses normative
questions that are unanswerable by empirical political science.4
Certain questions elude resolution by empirical observation—
e.g., How should scarce goods be distributed? Why should persons
comply with law? What actions may a state permissibly coerce?
Ironically, such normative questions also seem to have eluded
Berlin. Instead of positing and defending a coherent set of
answers to these questions, Berlin’s approach to political theory
was far more circumspect, concerned foremost to recite the
history of answers supplied by the mighty dead, whom he chided
for ignoring either the irreducible plurality of value or the
mischievous tendency of “positive” liberty.
Then came John Rawls. After the publication of A Theory of
Justice in 1971, Rawls’s critic and colleague Robert Nozick wrote,
“Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls’s
theory or explain why not.”5 Most have chosen to work within or
against Rawls’s framework, using tools supplied by analytic
1. University Professor, New York University.
2. D.Phil. (Oxon.), J.D. (Harvard), Law clerk to Hon. James O. Browning, United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
3. Regents Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University.
4. Isaiah Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist?, in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES
143–172 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979).
5. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974).
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philosophy. The lion’s share of the work has been focused on
clarifying the meaning and requirements of justice and explaining
the relationship of justice to other normative concepts.
Representative of this tradition is G.A. Cohen, late Quain
Professor at University College London and previously Chichele
Professor at Oxford. Cohen began his Oxford graduate seminar
on contemporary political philosophy by teaching that the subject,
properly understood, concerned three distinct questions: What
are the correct principles of justice? What should the state do?
And which social states of affairs ought to be brought about?6
Today, those normative questions delineate much of the
discipline of political theory. But compare those questions with
this one: Are there decisive reasons for or against a
supermajoritarian cloture rule in the upper chamber of a
legislative assembly? Like Cohen’s triptych of questions, the
“filibuster question” is neither empirical nor legal, but
straightforwardly normative. As such, the inquiry about the
filibuster rule falls somewhere within the discipline-organizing
question about what the state should do. Yet, having begun at
Cohen’s high level of generality, it is unclear how, or even if, the
specific “filibuster question” will be addressed. This is because the
general question––What should the state do?––leads naturally to
subsequent inquiry about which goals states should pursue and
what states must not do in their pursuit. From that point of
departure, a political theorist likely proceeds to further discussion
of the justification of those goals that the state should promote
and the foundation of the rights that constrain state action.
Political theory never gets to questions about cloture rules; unless,
of course, it begins there.
And that is just what Jeremy Waldron has in mind. With the
publication of Political Political Theory, the latest (though, not
current) holder of Oxford’s Chichele Professorship, now
University Professor at New York University Law School, hopes
to “encourage young political theorists to understand that there is
life beyond Rawls” (p. ix). Although one may doubt whether the
refocusing that Waldron has in mind really is to be found “beyond
Rawls”—for Rawls was also deeply focused on the justification of
democratic institutions—Waldron’s meaning is clear: For those
6. G.A. Cohen, How to do Political Philosophy, in ON THE CURRENCY OF
EGALITARIAN JUSTICE, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 227 (Michael
Otsuka ed., 2011).
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working in political theory, he says, there is life “beyond the
abstract understanding of liberty, justice, and egalitarianism. . .”
(p. ix). Instead of attempting to elucidate the meaning of our
largest normative concepts, instead of testing the soundness of
hypothesized normative principles against all manner of
counterfactual thought experiments, political theory should focus
on the evaluation of the rules and structure of state institutions.
I. THE REORIENTATION OF POLITICAL THEORY
With the exception of three chapters, the book collects part
of Waldron’s already-published work on law and political theory.
Together, the individual pieces amount to a program to reorient
the focus of political theory toward constitutional law and
institutional design. For Waldron, political theory ought to be
more concerned, in the first instance, with the design and
justification of the institutions that comprise constitutional,
democratic republics. This is what he means by calling for a return
to political political theory. Three chapters, the first and the two
last, frame Waldron’s project—viz., Chapter 1, “Political Political
Theory” (pp. 1-22), Chapter 12, “Isaiah Berlin’s Neglect of
Enlightenment Constitutionalism” (pp. 274-289), and Chapter 13,
“The Constitutional Politics of Hannah Arendt,” (pp. 290-307). It
is in these chapters that Waldron most clearly issues his call to
refocus the task of political theory. There, he most clearly
provides the reasons demanding a reorientation.
In a way, Waldron’s call for reform seems to issue from the
oak-paneled Senior Common Room. No one would seriously
dispute that the United Kingdom is undergoing a period of
constitutional change and institutional upheaval. Only a few
reminders are needed: Brexit, the potential secession of Scotland
or Northern Ireland, the establishment of the UK Supreme Court,
the reform of the House of Lords, and the Fixed Term Parliament
Act. There is a concern that the present curriculum of the “Theory
of Politics” course, which is compulsory for Oxford’s flagship
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics degree, is not endowing its
graduates with a better-than-par understanding of the normative
issues involved in the United Kingdom’s institutional
transformation. Waldron suggests that the academies in the
United States may be more attuned to institutional questions,
given the acute public sensitivity to the countermajoritarian
aspect of judicial review (p. 18). One would like to hope so;
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however, we cannot help but wonder if American law students,
much less undergraduates majoring in public policy or political
science, are comparatively better prepared than their Oxonian
counterparts to analyze analogous American institutional
questions concerning, for example, the basis of reapportionment,
the institutional actors responsible for redistricting, or the growth
of executive power and the possible limits thereto. Perhaps
American law students were at a comparative advantage during
the days when the legal process school informed the curriculum,
but those days have passed.
Waldron’s project to reorient political theory toward
questions of the value and design of institutions is not only
motivated by the pedagogical concern that students of politics
should be able to think through the institutional challenges that
they will inherit. His call for reorientation seems to be motivated
by a much darker concern—specifically, the threat posed to
constitutional democracies by the concentration of executive
power. We, the inheritors of “Enlightenment constitutionalism,”
should deeply understand how our institutions legitimate and
channel the exercise of state power, lest we sign such power over
to an executive who neither apprehends the values of
constitutionalism, nor cares.
Hinting at this greatest concern, Waldron refers, both in the
first and the last chapter, to Christian Meier’s biography of Julius
Caesar.7 The reference illuminates what Waldron perceives ought
to be political theory’s animating fear. In the book, Waldron
quotes Meier twice for the particular threat that Caesar
represents:
Caesar was insensitive to political institutions and the complex
ways in which they operate …. He could see them only as
instruments in the interplay of forces. His cold gaze passed
through everything that Roman society still believed in, lived
by, valued and defended. He had no feeling for the power of
institutions … but only what he found useful or troublesome
about them.… In Caesar’s eyes no one existed but himself and
his opponents.… The scene was cleared of any suprapersonal
elements (pp. 14-15, 306).

The reader is to take the lesson that, from a certain
viewpoint, those institutions that structure and limit state power
7. CHRISTIAN MEIER, CAESAR 358–59 (David McLintock trans., Basic Books 1995)
(1982).
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may be de-reified—that is, seen through, as really nothing more
than the individuals who comprise them and, thus, as nothing
more than sets of friends or enemies. Once the institutions that
separate and protect individuals from concentrated executive
power are bathed away, warns Waldron, what remains is politics
at its most unmediated and perilous. Once institutional bulwarks
are discredited and are seen to be nothing more than “parchment
barriers” after all, only unmediated power remains.
Such unmediated power can manifest in different forms. For
instance, it can be highly concentrated in the executive branch.
Waldron succinctly characterizes the view of the executive who,
like Caesar, successfully devalues, discredits, and even “sees
through” the institutions that previously existed to constrain his
or her power: “Now there is just you, and me, and the issue of my
greatness” (p. 15).
By contrast, the unmediated power that threatens
constitutional institutions may also be highly diffuse. The political
action characteristic of mass movements that express impatience
with and suspicion of representation, political parties, and
parliamentary procedure, is no less pathological for being diffuse.
Waldron offers a formulation that captures exactly what is so
terrifying about mob rule when the de-reification and
disappearance of constitutional structures is complete: “Now
there is just you and me and our interest in justice” (p. 15).
For Waldron, either way, the emergence of unmediated
power heralds the end of both constitutional government and the
preconditions for deliberative democracy. Whether shaped by a
Caesar or by a Jacobin mass, the de-institutionalized landscape
lies worlds away from the green and pleasant fields of
constitutional democracy. Waldron’s implication for the activity
of political theory is unmistakable: because the raison d’être of
modern, constitutional republics is to prevent exactly the
emergence of such unmediated power, so too should it be the
organizing concern of academic political theory.
Waldron claims that the channeling, and thus the avoidance,
of unmediated power was the also the organizing project of
Enlightenment constitutionalism—“one of the most important
achievements of the eighteenth century Enlightenment” (p. 274).
Under the banner of “Enlightenment constitutionalism” we may
group a core set of interrelated, institutional ideas that, although
having previously emerged, became clear in the late eighteenth
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century. In abbreviated statement, they are: (1) the premise that
sovereignty, i.e., the ultimate authority to make and enforce law,
inheres in the People itself (or themselves); (2) the notion that a
constitution is fundamental law—distinct in both prestige and
pedigree from ordinary legislation—and that such fundamental
law grants and limits the powers of government; (3) the idea that
the powers of government are susceptible to both definition and
separation and, accordingly, may be located in different branches;
(4) the commitment to the idea of actual, not virtual,
representation of the People by government, such that
governmental actors may be understood to be agents of specific
groupings of the People and subject to their direction and recall;
(5) the conviction that the People have rights against some types
of governmental interference and that those rights are enshrined
in fundamental law; and (6) the empowerment of the judiciary to
review the actions of other branches of government for
conformity with the powers both granted and limited by the
fundamental law.8
Waldron identifies the main current of the history of political
theory as the genealogy of exactly this set of ideas, whose canon
he bookends with Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1680)
and the constitutional sections of Kant’s Rechtslehre (1797).
Belonging to the canon, Waldron includes the writings of
Madison, Sieyès, Voltaire, Diderot, Paine, Jefferson, Condorcet,
Hamilton, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (p. 276). What these
disparate members of the Enlightenment pantheon shared, first
and foremost, was a predominant interest in the institutions of
government and how those institutions channel political power to
preclude tyranny. Their shared project concerning the makings of
constitutional theory is the most significant tradition of political
thought in the Enlightenment or since. Thus, Political Political
Theory not only contains a call for reorientation in the objects of
theory, but also suggests that the way the history of political
thought is conceptualized and taught is also due for realignment.
And so, it is Isaiah Berlin—the much celebrated historian of
ideas—who is the object of special criticism for neglecting
Enlightenment constitutionalism in his ambitious but desultory
writings. After “ransacking” this oeuvre, Waldron concludes that
8. See generally Gordon Wood, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, in THE
IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES 171-187 (2011).
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Berlin, at best, was just not interested in questions about
institutional structure. Furthermore, Waldron holds Berlin
responsible in part for the neglect of institutional concerns in
political theory as it is conducted and taught in the United
Kingdom. That might be unfair, and it likely overemphasizes the
contribution of a single academician, even Berlin. In any event, as
Waldron impishly puts it, “[t]he old man’s reputation can take it”
(p. 289).
II. THE ACTIVITY OF POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY
How then does political political theory approach questions
regarding the design of political institutions? From the book’s
title, empirical political scientists might understand Waldron to be
offering some appreciation of the importance of empirical and
quantitative analysis in the study of choices that various polities
face in the area of institutional design. They would be
disappointed. The book contains very little in the way of empirical
or quantitative analysis that might guide inquiry into institutional
design. Even if it proposes to be political, “political political
theory” remains theory, through and through.
Not that the aloofness from empirical work is necessarily
grounds for objection. Much in political political theory is
exemplary of what, by now, amounts to “best practices” in
political theory, as it is conducted in analytically attuned
philosophy and political science faculties. Waldron’s most oftenused tool is common to (not-especially-political) political
theory—namely, straightforward conceptual analysis to
illuminate and parse variations in the meanings of our normative
concepts. It is just that in political political theory, the lens of
conceptual analysis is turned toward institutional concepts that
have received comparatively less attention than the marquee
concepts of justice and liberty.
The value of such conceptual analysis is easy to
underestimate. The illumination and arrangement of institutional
concepts gives clarity and precision to normative argument about
institutional design. It also permits us to consider options in the
design of political institutions that might have remained hidden
from view, behind some elision or equivocation. For Waldron, this
is the major lesson of Locke’s dissection of the executive power in
the Second Treatise—“to disaggregate and analyze the different
powers traditionally assigned to the Crown, to identify the limits

FARRIS & EDMUNDSON_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

500

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/17 7:05 AM

[Vol. 32:493

to each one, and to make sure that the Crown does not escape
these limits by blurring the public’s understanding of its various
functions” (p. 92 n. 78). Locke’s analysis of the different
components of the executive power was a necessary step for
subsequent development in the argument for the separation of
powers and the accountability and oversight of the executive.
Throughout the chapters, Waldron deploys the tools of
conceptual analysis, dissecting the “theoretical anatomy” of our
political institutions—legislatures especially—in thoughtprovoking ways. For example, the chapter entitled
“Representative Lawmaking” separates the features of legislation
that make it a distinct form of lawmaking, as compared to the
lawmaking by judges and executive agencies, treaty, or custom
(pp. 125-144). Better still, the chapter entitled “Accountability
and Insolence” which is first published in this collection, offers an
abbreviated “anatomy lesson” in republicanism (pp. 167–194).
Republicanism, in its most encompassing definition, is the view
“that the business conducted by government is the public business
… rather than the patrimony of any privileged individual or
family” (p. 175). Waldron cleverly uses the legal concepts of trust
and agency to analyze variations in republican thought regarding
the relationship between the government and the People.
On the one hand, republican government may be structured
along the lines of a trust, wherein a settlor establishes a legal entity
for the advantage of a beneficiary and empowers a trustee to act
for the beneficiary. Although the beneficiary (the People) may
hold the trustee (the government) accountable in certain ways
that are formally structured according to the terms of the
settlement, the beneficiary may not instruct or remove the trustee.
There may be several lines of accountability in which one office
of government formally oversees another office to verify that the
latter is acting for the People’s benefit in accordance with the
terms of the settlement. The government as trustee, however, is
not directly responsive to the People: neither may the People
instruct the government, nor may government officials be directly
called to account or replaced by popular demand. Waldron
associates the trust model of republican thought with the structure
of the Venetian republic where, as he reads the history, the public
was the beneficiary of the official conduct and the work of the
officials was scrutinized by the senate for compliance with the rule
of law and civic virtue (pp. 176-177).
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On the other hand, a republican government may be better
explained by the concept of agency, in which an agent (the
government) acts on behalf of a principal (the People). Under the
agency model, the principal may call the agent to give an account
of the agent’s actions taken on behalf of principal, and the
principal may sanction or replace or terminate the agency
relationship. The analogy might even extend to include a
principal’s power to instruct the agent and the agent’s duty to
keep the principal informed. This agency model of republican
thought introduces a particularly democratic form of
accountability, and Waldron points (p. 177), as an example, to
Madison’s description in Federalist 57 of the comparatively short
term of electoral office in the House of Representatives:
[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support
in the members a habitual recollection of their dependence on
the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by
the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of
power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when
their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be
reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which
they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful
discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a
renewal of it.9

The trust and the agency models of the accountability of
government in republican thought are predicated on very
different premises about the relationship of a people and a state
that governs them. Under the agency model, the state belongs to
the People; it is not just set up for their benefit. Therefore, the
agency conception of republicanism entails the need to establish
democratic structures by which the People themselves can
actively demand an account of, if not instruct, their agents in
government because the government acts for them and in their
name. The trust model, by contrast, does not begin with a premise
of popular sovereignty. Nor does it necessarily entail democratic
procedures.
Waldron’s use of the legal concepts of trust and agency as
analogies for thinking about the state is not novel (and the book
makes no reference to Maitland), but these analogies shine light
on conceptual variations of accountability. They also prompt
questions regarding the accountability of our own institutions. For
9.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
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example, Waldron invites the reader to ponder whether the
federal judiciary in the United States is better described in terms
of the trust or the agency model of accountability.10 He suggests
that the exercise of judicial review of legislation is a “mediated
form of democratic accountability” in which “court procedures
operat[e] insistently to require legislators and other officials to
give an account of themselves. . . .” (p. 193).
If by a “form of democratic accountability” Waldron means
to refer to an agency-based characterization of the accountability
of the federal judiciary, this view is doubtful. The relationship
between the federal judiciary and the People is arguably better
reflected by the trust analogy. Judicial review of legislation for
conformance with both the powers and the individual rights
conferred by the Constitution appears more akin to the internal
oversight of trustees who ensure that some directors act in
conformance with the settlement and for the beneficiary’s
interest. Federal judges are not subject to popular instruction or
to recall by popular will. Nor is it obvious that judges are, in any
significant sense, representatives. Moreover, at least some federal
judges on the highest bench have denied it. For example, when
interpreting the ordinary meaning of “elected representatives” in
a federal statute to exclude judges, the late Justice Scalia, joined
by two other Justices, flatly said that “judges are not
representatives.”11 This pronouncement, at least with respect to
federal judges, might easily command agreement: The People
cannot easily call federal judges to account for their exercise of
the power of judicial review, even through their representative
agents in Congress. Nor can the People replace them or easily
terminate their tenure. However, the defensibility of Scalia’s view
with respect to state judges who are subject to periodic partisan
or recall elections (or both) is more complicated. The
accountability of democratically controllable state judges may
tend more toward the agency-based model.
In addition to conceptual dissection, which Waldron does
deftly and innovatively, another common movement in normal
political theory is to stake out a set of normative principles and
10. The question is latent in The Federalist No. 78, in which Hamilton writes that it is
“rational to suppose … that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
11. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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then evaluate some state of affairs by reference to those
normative principles. Often in political theory this move involves
the evaluation of some distribution of benefits and burdens under
some principle of distributive justice. Surveying Waldron’s
disparate book chapters, this movement also occurs in political
political theory, but there the normative principles staked out are
geared to evaluate some aspect of institutional design.
So, for example, in “Principles of Legislation,” Waldron
maps out seven principles by which we may evaluate the
legitimacy of legislation (pp. 149-150). By legitimacy, we mean
that the law admits of a justification for compliance that might
reasonably be demanded by those persons whose preferences or
moral views were not enacted. As Waldron notes, the concept of
legitimacy has a “more focused aspect … to reconcile the losing
party in particular to the decision that has been made” (p. 255). A
lawmaking procedure increases in legitimacy—that is, it produces
laws that better satisfy the demand for a justification of
coercion—to the extent it satisfies such “principles of legislation.”
Under these principles, a law is more legitimate to the extent that
it is (1) made explicitly (2) by representatives, who (3) take due
care, (4) deliberate, (5) respect disagreement and (6) respect
formality in decision-making, and is the outcome of (7) majority
decision. Waldron posits this non-exhaustive set of values as
especially appropriate to evaluate whether a particular
procedural rule increases or decreases the legitimacy of laws that
are the outcome of legislative procedures the rule, in part,
comprises.
Now, these individual principles can point in different
directions with respect to how a particular procedural rule
contributes to, or detracts from, the legitimacy of law. To
complicate matters further, a rule’s satisfaction of one principle
may depend on the satisfaction of other principles. Consider the
above-mentioned Senate filibuster rule, Senate Rule XXII, and
the evaluation of that rule under Waldron’s “principles of
legislation.” A supermajoritarian cloture rule in effect requires a
supermajority vote for the passage of legislation, thus failing to
satisfy the majoritarianism principle and, consequently,
detracting from the legitimacy of the procedure of which it forms
a part. Yet, in so doing, the same supermajoritarian cloture rule
might also render a law-making procedure more deliberative and
more respectful of disagreement, and thus might add to the
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legitimacy of the laws it works to produce. But these legitimacyconferring benefits of a supermajoritarian cloture rule depend on
how the rule is invoked and received by the legislators on all sides
of legislative debate. Hence, the legislators’ respect for the
formality of the procedural rules and the legislators’ satisfaction
of their duty to take care also inform whether a supermajoritarian
cloture rule adds to or detracts from the legitimacy of law.
This abbreviated evaluation of the filibuster rule is offered as
an example to suggest that the full normative analysis of
procedural rules might become quite complicated. The
satisfaction of “principles of legislation” by any given procedural
rule will likely be interdependent, polycentric, and fact-sensitive.
In the chapter devoted to “principles of legislation,” Waldron
does not investigate the legitimacy of any particular procedural
rule in light of the particular principles he stakes out. Rather, he
offers a way of evaluating “the rulebook” in a light that is distinct
from an analysis about the outcomes of the legislative
procedure—statutes and their effects on the distribution of
benefits and burdens. In so doing, Waldron anticipates the shape
of normative arguments about choices we encounter in the design
of a law-making institutions. After all, Political Political Theory is
meant to be a paradigm-introducing work, not a commentary on,
say, Riddick’s Senate Procedure.12
III. POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY AND
NON-IDEAL THEORY
Like the empirical political scientists who may be tempted by
the book’s title, other readers may come to Waldron’s book with
forgivable yet incorrect assumptions about his project. From its
calling card, one might suspect that political political theory will
differentiate itself as offering a non-ideal version of political
theory. Non-ideal theory seeks to offer normative principles
about what the state should do, and what the obligations of
citizens are, given that the current state of affairs is deeply unjust,
that we can realistically expect that individuals will, at best, only
partially comply with the demands of justice, and that a just
distribution of benefits and burdens might not be accessible from
here. In a sense, non-ideal theory takes people as they are and
12. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE:
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES (Alan S. Furmin ed., 1992).
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laws as they might be; however, depending on the assumptions
about people as they are––and particularly that set of people who
aspire to public office—that Rousseauvian methodological
premise can result in a political theory that is deeply interested in
questions of institutional design in order to achieve stability, not
justice. And the worse one assumes people to be (and, again,
especially those people who aspire to public office), the greater
the emphasis on a theory of politics that privileges stability.
Think, for example, of the premise that Hume advised in
questions of constitutional design:
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in
contriving any system of government, and fixing the several
checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought
supposed to be a knave, and to have no other end, in all his
actions, than private interest.13

The purpose of the person-as-knave design principle serves
to protect governmental institutions from the ambition of the
people who inhabit them. Madison also made reference to the
knavery principle in his argument for the ratification of the
federal constitution: “Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition … it may be a reflection on human nature, that such
devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government.”14
Waldron references Hume and Madison’s non-ideal interest
in institutional design very early in the book to give a sense of the
institutionalist turn he believes is required of political theory. But
unlike the aforementioned passages, Waldron’s argument is not
that normative theory should be more concerned with questions
of institutional design because he believes that persons are knaves
and, therefore, political theory should focus on how institutions
can embank and direct the currents of their self-interest and
irrationality. To the contrary, Waldron resists approaches to
questions of institutional design that begin by taking people as
they are, in the pejorative sense. To see this in the round, it is
helpful to recall Waldron’s skepticism of the latest deployment of
a kind of knavery principle in popular writing about questions of
institutional design.
13. David Hume, On the Independence of Parliament, in ESSAYS: MORAL,
POLITICAL, LITERARY 42 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (1742).
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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The knavery premise is not limited to great questions of
constitutional design, posited with the purpose to preserve
constitutional structures and to achieve stability. Rather, the same
knavery premise has lately been employed, albeit in a slightly
modified form, in the design of governmental institutions to
promote various welfare-related ends. Imagine, then, that people
are not only knaves, concerned only with their private interest,
but also that they are not very capable of making decisions that
best promote their interest. In short, imagine persons are unclever
knaves. Confronted with a world populated with unclever knaves,
so-called libertarian paternalists like Cass Sunstein recommend
that government ought to ensure the design of a choice
architecture that leverages the unclever knaves’ heuristics, biases,
and laziness in ways that promote their interest. So, for example,
because unclever knaves must save something for retirement, the
government should ensure that employee 401(k) savings plans are
not only offered, but that both enrollment and a certain
contribution level are the default position, subject to an opt-out.
And because unclever knaves must also eat lunch, the lunch staff
should ensure that the broccoli appears first in the lunch line,
where one has to request a tray or large cup. In other words,
“nudging,” a well popularized approach to governmental
regulation, assumes a form of the eighteenth century
methodological assumption of person-as-knave.
Beyond the pages of the book under review, Waldron has
expressed skepticism of “nudging” exactly because that theory of
government regulation views persons as little more than unclever
means toward their own ends, a view that falls far short of how
government ought to apprehend and to respond to the dignity of
persons.15 While Political Political Theory begins by adverting to
Hume’s and Madison’s use of the knavery premise as a ready
example of thinking about institutional design, Waldron is quick
to recommend that the design of government institutions should
be evaluated not only according to how those institutions promote
interests, but also according to how political institutions respect
the voice and dignity of citizens. Waldron says, “It is people’s
capacity for judgment that is at stake when we look for a
democratic mode of lawmaking and if we are to respect that
capacity, we must respect the forms, structures, and processes that
15.

Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV., Oct. 9, 2014, at 21–23.

FARRIS & EDMUNDSON_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

BOOK REVIEWS

7/11/17 7:05 AM

507

can house and frame it” (pp. 141-142). This passage amounts to a
rejection of approaches to the structure of governmental
institutions that begin from a knavery premise, and it is of a piece
with Waldron’s suspicion about “nudging.”
These sidebar comments about Waldron’s reaction to the
emphasis on “nudging” allows an important insight into the
paradigm he offers: in an important sense, political political
theory is not non-ideal at all. Its approach to the design and
evaluation of political institutions is not premised on human
failings. Nor does it begin with the recognition of unavoidable
facts that constrain the achievement of justice. Moreover, political
political theory is not especially interested in evaluating the
design of political institutions by reference to their achievement
of a particular social goal. Political political theory is not, in the
first instance, interested in welfare-denominated patterns of
distribution.
Waldron asks us to understand the value of political
institutions beyond their instrumental value in promoting some
independent end. Unlike Hume’s and Madison’s maxim to
understand institutions as means to control the ambition of the
participants, and unlike the soft paternalists who, aware of our
biases and inertia, understand institutions as means to more
efficiently promote our interests, political political theory
challenges the theorist to see the worth of institutions beyond
their ability to promote some independently valuable state of
affairs. The value of political institutions lies, at bottom, not in the
distributive outcomes they produce, but rather in their ability to
enable the ultimate sovereignty of the People by ensuring
democratic participation and government accountability. In other
words, it is most important that political institutions are designed
to achieve legitimacy, even if not justice.
The focus on the value of political institutions that exists
apart from the justice of the laws they enact and enforce, is
connected with political political theory’s motivating concern
about a Caesarian executive who, neither understanding nor
caring for the importance of constitutions, is able to “see through”
institutional entities. Political political theory suggests that
understanding the value of political institutions primarily by
reference to their legitimacy makes those institutions more
concrete, such that they cannot be easily de-reified or suddenly
made to disappear. And making institutions more concrete—i.e.,
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reifying institutions that are born of parchment—is an imperative
in view of their proper normative justification, which regards
them as valuable in ways that are not necessarily connected to
their outcomes. This is the central thesis of political political
theory and the single theme that unites Waldron’s disparate
essays on institutions.
Concerns about accountability, voice, and dignity are latent
in relationships not only between political institution and persons,
but also as between institutions themselves. Waldron introduces
this point by reference to William Forbath’s Law and the Shaping
of the American Labor Movement,16 where Forbath reviews the
history of judicial review of progressive-era labor legislation.
After labor organizers and sympathetic legislators successfully
enacted statutes regulating hours and conditions, the courts
invalidated them as unconstitutional. The frustration of those in
the labor movement was immense: “I would kill them all and see
if that would be considered unconstitutional.”17 Waldron’s
emphasis is not that the exercise of judicial review in this period
was a setback for the justice of the labor legislation enacted by
progressives (although he does not deny that); rather, his
emphasis is on the disrespect of the legislative institutions shown
by some members of the judiciary. Although the workers had
grounds to complain of injustice suffered, Waldron suggests that
an equal, if not deeper, concern is the indignity and disrespect that
governmental participants in one branch accorded to the work of
another. There, the legislative institutions—the voices and
concerns they amplified—were seen as a nullity, were seen
through, were made to disappear. And that disrespect of a
representative lawmaking institution should leave an impression
as deep as the injustice in the distribution of benefits and burdens
that the laborers were forced to bear.
IV. A LIFE BEYOND RAWLS?
For all its emphasis on the design of representative
institutions to ensure their legitimacy, Political Political Theory
has surprisingly little to say about the pervasive power, and
tendency, of money to corrupt institutions and officials and to
16. WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 47 (1991).
17. Id.
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erode political legitimacy.18 In these essays, he ignores the
corrupting influence of money not only in general but also where
it is obviously pertinent to his specific treatment of alternative
institutional designs. For example, the choice between unicameral
and bicameral legislatures is fraught with consequences for the
economically less-advantaged citizen. A second legislative
chamber creates an additional “veto point” likely to obstruct—in
fact, typically intended to obstruct—the will of electoral
majorities, particularly when that will is directed toward
redistributive ends.
The problem of money in politics is not a merely
valetudinarian concern. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have shown
that there is a striking correlation between an increasing number
of veto points in a constitutional structure and an increased
pattern of economic inequality.19 The greater the number of veto
points, the more likely that greater private economic resources
may be converted into unequal opportunities to shape legislation.
A political theory attentive to questions of institutional design
should not ignore empirical studies about the myriad ways that
the hydrologic pressure of money might break through to
influence the functioning of political institutions.
Waldron promises “life beyond Rawls,” but the book
distracts attention from the central and truly hard problem of
institutionalizing constitutional democracy, the problem that
Rawls despairingly once called “the curse of money.”20 A
constitutional democracy will inevitably generate unequal wealth,
just as it will inevitably engender a plurality of incompatible but
equally reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good life.
As Rawls explained, these circumstances are inherent to the
operation of a liberal constitutional democracy over time. They
do not merely derive from the version of the knavery principle
that Waldron excusably elects to set aside. Moreover, unlike the
fact of reasonable pluralism, disparately greater amounts of
18. Granted, Waldron does, in passing, deplore the “conservative strategy of
appropriating the rule of law as an ideal for something like an IMF/World Bank agenda,
which sees its aim as that of securing property rights and external investment against
legislative encroachment” (p. 33).
19. See Alfred Stepan & Juan J. Linz, Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the
Quality of Democracy in the United States, 9 PERSP. POL. 841, 841–56 (2011); see also
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564, 564–81 (2014).
20. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 139 (1999).
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wealth tend inevitably to impart political advantages. The
tendency of political institutions necessarily to create the
conditions for unequal political influence is not a fact that a
political political theory can ignore. An utter disregard of the
money problem is Political Political Theory’s most glaring
omission. Waldron chides “Rawls and his followers” for failing to
understand that the burdens of judgment apply to “issues of
justice and social policy” as well as to “religion, ethics, and
comprehensive conceptions” (p. 94). Set aside the question
whether this charge is adequately substantiated by what Waldron
has “written elsewhere” (one of the more common phrases in the
book); it does not even begin to illuminate why he has chosen to
ignore the money problem when setting out a political political
theory.
Waldron laments that Berlin’s “lack of interest in institutions
and constitutions has turned out to be contagious.” Yet, Berlin’s
inattention was not singlehandedly responsible for political
theory’s excessive focus on the meaning of concepts such as justice
or liberty, to the exclusion of thinking about institutional design.
“This,” according to Waldron, “is something that would have
happened any-way, under the influence of Rawls…” (p. 288,
emphasis added). This is an astonishing claim. And this passage,
along with the book as a whole, reflects an almost reckless
misunderstanding of Rawls. Rawls deliberately chose not to
bookend “Enlightenment constitutionalism” between Locke and
Kant. Rawls chose not to, in part, because he read Marx as a
friendly critic rather than an implacable foe of this very project.
Just as Berlin had no serious interest in institutions, Waldron
shows no serious interest in “the curse of money,” not even to
acknowledge it by expressly setting it aside. Unlike Rawls,
Waldron, at least in this collection, shows no interest in how
institutional and constitutional designs might cabin (or “house”)
the money problem without squelching liberty.
True, one might plead realism on Waldron’s behalf. The
United States Supreme Court, in a line of decisions running from
Buckley v. Valeo21 to McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission,22 has declared that the Constitution forbids
Congress to legislate with the aim of promoting what Rawls called
21.
22.

421 U.S. 1 (1976).
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
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the “fair value of political liberty”—i.e., a roughly equal actual
(not merely formal) chance of each citizen to affect political
outcomes.23 But political theory is not constrained by what the
United States Supreme Court happens to have held; the discipline
has aspirations about choices in institutional design that go
beyond the constraints on what may be reasonably advocated for
in a legal brief. And Waldron does not say that Rawls’s concern
about fair value, and with the institutional devices that might
assure it, is utopian or passé. In fact, he does not mention the
Rawlsian institutionalist concern with fair value at all. This quiet
insouciance about the problem of reconciling political equality
and economic inequality gives the collection not merely a
debating-society flavor, but also an ideological tinge.24 If it is a
taste of “life beyond Rawls,” one must ask whether it is a way of
life a political theorist—especially a political political theorist—
ought to be living.
The “curse of money,” then, is not only a justice problem. It
is also a legitimacy problem. There is no reason for political
political theory, which, as Waldron convincingly shows, is a
fruitful and necessary corrective for contemporary political
theory, not to address it as such.

23. In an uncharacteristicly overt tone of despondence, Rawls wrote, “Historically
one of the main defects of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair
value of political liberty. The necessary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they
never seem to have been seriously entertained.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
198–99 (rev. ed., Harvard University Press, 1999). It would be tragic, we think, if political
theory, under the guise of realism, were to internalize this attitude.
24. “[P]olitical philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly as a defense of
an unjust and unworthy status quo, and thus of being ideological in Marx’s sense. From
time to time we must ask whether justice as fairness, or any other view, is ideological in
this way; and if not, why not?” JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 4
n. 4 (2001).

